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In the latter part of 1926, the National Conference of Com- 
missioners on Uniform State Laws, through its Committee on 
Amendments of Uniform Acts, undertook the preparation of a 
series of amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law. The 
time for such action seemed particularly appropriate inasmuch 
as the act had then been adopted by all of the states, though 
with minor variations in text in many cases. There had been a 
considerable amount of experience with the statute; for in the 
principal commercial states it had been in effect from twenty to 
thirty years. That there was need for some action to harmonize 
the conflicting interpretations which had developed, and possibly 
to reconcile the variations in provisions of the different statutes, 
was scarcely open to question, if the original objective, a uni- 
form body of law relating to negotiable paper, was to be realized 
to the extent reasonably possible. The committee designated 
Professor Williston to undertake the work, a singularly happy 
appointment. 
At the outset a question arose in the committee as to whether 
a comprehensive revision of the act should be undertaken, the 
alternative being to draft only such amendments as would be 
necessary to correct the more serious conflicts. Practically, 
there is much force in the argument for the latter alternative, 
as it is a long and difficult process to get uniform legislative 
action in each of the forty-eight states. This argument works 
both ways, however, as it has been suggested that any action 
at this time, if it must be adopted in all states before any 
other steps are taken, would postpone for many years the draft- 
ing of any additional amendments that might later seem desir- 
able. Thus the attempt at the beginning to agree upon a formula 
of comprehensive or limited revision was probably waste motion. 
Of first importance would be a survey of all points regarded as 
perhaps needing amendment. 
There is, however, room for considerable discussion as to the 
character of any revision, whether limited or comprehensive in 
scope. Should it be confined, in the interest of greater clarity 
and accuracy of expression, to the correction of verbal incon- 
sistencies in the present act? There are many of these, as would 
no doubt be true in the case of any piece of legislation covering 
so involved a subject. But notwithstanding these difficulties, 
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it is believed that the statute has in the main proven itself to 
be a highly satisfactory piece of legislation.l Hence it is at 
least doubtful whether a series of amendments designed to make 
incidental improvements in wording, where in thirty years of 
operation there has been little or no difficulty in the courts on 
the points in question, would receive or indeed merit much 
legislative attention. Of course, insofar as amendments strike 
at actual misinterpretations prevailing in a particular state, 
it would be a considerable gain to have them adopted in the 
interest of uniformity. The net result of such changes, however, 
would be merely to write into the law, somewhat more positively 
and definitely, the rules approved when the act was first drafted, 
or to set up the common law decisions as the principle guide 
to revision. 
It would be of much greater moment, and would result in 
greater benefit, if the committee should undertake, perhaps at 
this time with regard to only a limited number of points, a very 
thoroughgoing and comprehensive investigation of the facts 
involved. This of course would be quite a different thing 
from a mere attempt to square the statute with decisions ante- 
dating its adoption. It might well take several years. While 
common law decisions would be entitled to much weight in such 
an inquiry, there is no reason to believe that they should be 
taken as the last word on the subject: that results arrived at 
by courts in other times and with other conditions before them 
are necessarily the perfect answer for today. Certainly no one 
has yet made anything comparable to such an investigation. 
Of the many illustrations that could be used to make the point 
clearer only two or three can be considered. To any one familiar 
with banking practice, it is common knowledge that there has 
been a considerable increase in the use of acceleration provisions 
in time notes since the Negotiable Instruments Law was drafted. 
The Act expressly recognized the clause in use in installment 
notes at the time it was drafted which provided for the accelera- 
tion of maturity on non-payment of principle or interest. The 
Act was drawn to provide that such clauses should not affect 
negotiability.2 But in recent years lenders have sought to em- 
ploy many other types of clauses: for example, provisions for 
acceleration on failure to deposit additional collateral, on failure 
to pay taxes or insurance premiums, or in event of failure in 
business. The statute provides simply that an instrument to be 
negotiable must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or deter- 
minable future time, and that if payable on a contingency it can 
1 The editor of BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed. 1926) 
states in the preface that the Act has "made great advances upon the 
common law." 
2 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 2 (3). 
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not be negotiable.3 It is, of course, common case-book learning 
that the decisions on the negotiability of instruments contain- 
ing such provisions are, as might be expected, in conflict.4 
What should be done by way of amendment? T'his calls for 
a determination of what should be the principal considerations 
guiding the committee to its decisions. And this inquiry calls 
in question most of the principles of negotiable instruments 
law. Would a more extensive use of such clauses hinder the 
free circulation of commercial paper? Would it introduce ele- 
ments of uncertainty which should not be allowed in commercial 
paper? Would it operate to give lenders an unfair advantage 
over borrowers? 
If it be assumed that some extension of the use of such clauses 
might well be approved without affecting negotiability, what, 
if any, restrictions should be imposed? Do the same considera- 
tions apply to notes, drafts, and corporate or government bonds? 
Should an attempt be made to distinguish between types of 
clauses, approving only those having to do with the loan or its 
security? 5 Should the automatic or self-executing provision 
be declared to be operative only at the option of the holder, 
rather than immediately on the happening of the event of de- 
fault? 6 And should the subsequent bona fide purchaser of an 
instrument which has been accelerated automatically, or declared 
due by a prior holder, take the instrument as over-due paper 
subject to defenses? 
Before an answer may be given to these questions, there are 
certain somewhat general considerations which should be taken 
into account. Obviously in this situation what courts have said 
in the past, while a factor, is yet not one of chief importance. 
In the writer's view, the first consideration in amending the 
statute on this point, as indeed in arriving at a judicial decision 
in the absence of statute, should be to formulate a result which 
agrees, insofar as possible, with the understanding and conven- 
ience of all parties. The rule adopted by either court or legis- 
lature is not essentially different from what it would be if 
spelled out as one term in the contractual relationship of the par- 
ties. In the interest of convenience then, if court or legislature 
is to draft the contract, it should be one that accords with the 
3 Ibid. § 4. 
4 For example, see Holliday State Bank v. Hoffman, 85 Kan. 71, 116 
Pac. 239 (1911), 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 390 (1912). 5 See Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper (1919) 32 HARV. L. 
REV. 747. 
6 The federal rule is understood to be that acceleration does not occur 
in any case until the holder elects to declare it due. See Chicago Ry. 
v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 136 U. S. 268, 10 Sup. Ct. 999 (1890). 7 Hodge v. Wallace, 129 Wis. 84, 108 N. W. 212 (1906) (holder held 
to have acquired over-due paper subject to defenses). 
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basis on which most future transactions would normally be had. 
The rule must be understood in order to avoid as far as possible 
so-called mistakes of law. 
Of perhaps equal importance is the consideration that court 
or legislature must guard against overreaching, or unfair prac- 
tice. The rule adopted must square with the ethics of the com- 
munity. And as a third consideration it is obviously desirable, 
where possible, that the rule adopted should be one that can 
easily be applied by the courts. In many situations, of course, 
as in the adoption of the "reasonable time" test for due pre- 
sentment to charge indorsers, it has been thought impossible to 
formulate such a rule and the question has been frankly left for 
the courts to decide as cases arise.8 Some of these situations 
probably cannot be avoided, but their number should be strictly 
limited.9 If the rule accords with general convenience and un- 
derstanding, that fact alone in most cases gives assurance that 
it is reasonably fair, and will not require continual recourse to 
the courts for further construction. 
The above is no doubt known by all; the difficulty is to draft 
provisions in accord with it. If these are important considera- 
tions, it would seem to follow necessarily that the decision whch 
will survive as the good legislative rule must be formulated with 
thorough knowledge of the facts. This is not to disregard the 
possibility that in many situations business may accommodate 
itself to any one of several rules so long as the rule ultimately 
adopted is definite and understandable. In such case, the deci- 
sion may turn on the personal force of the advocate of one view 
as opposed to another. Nor do the above views overlook the 
fact that many decisions have been good where the court or 
legislature appears to have relied largely on its own good sense. 
In some cases the only practicable method is that of trial and 
error. But even in the usual case it is only rarely that available 
data has been given the weight to which it is entitled. 
In the case of the present illustration, the experience of Wis- 
consin should be of considerable value. That state, in adopting 
the act, modified it by providing that an instrument payable at 
a fixed or determinable future time might be payable before 
8 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 71, discussed infra p. 45. 
9 In the opinion of Justice Holmes the endeavor should be made even 
in tort law. See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 111, where it is 
said, ". . . the featureless generality, that the defendant was bound to 
use such care as a prudent man would do under the circumstances ought 
to be continually giving place to the specific one, that he was bound to 
use this or that precaution under these or those circumstances." It is 
of course much more important in commercial transactions that a definite 
rule should be formulated so that a person may know in advance just what 
is or is not sanctioned. 
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then on the happening of a contingency.10 To the writer this 
would seem to square with the above general considerations. 
It is readily understood by users of commercial paper. It should 
be convenient, much more so than drawing a separate accelera- 
tion agreement. It would seem to call for no fine spun judicial 
interpretations. This much would seem to be a good guess, but 
why guess? What has been the experience? Has it been fair 
to borrowers? Has there been any diminution in the interest 
rate to compensate for the increased security to lenders? Has 
the clause proven too broad, indicating that an attempt should 
be made to define the types of contingencies that may be allowed? 
In other words whatever reliance court, or legislature, may have 
in its own good judgment, it is doubly secure if buttressed with 
the facts that an investigation such as is here suggested should 
disclose. Any other course is hopelessly unscientific. 
There is another illustration which might well be used. At 
present there is in course of litigation in New York a question 
as to whether the refusal by a bank to certify a check should 
constitute a dishonor, so as to permit of immediate recourse 
against the drawer.1 Banks have asserted that certification was 
merely an accommodation on their part which they could grant or 
withhold at pleasure; and this view was reflected in an early 
New York case.12 On the other hand, the Negotiable Instru- 
ments Law is more plausibly construed as taking the view that 
refusal to certify counts at least as a dishonor, whether or not 
the bank should be responsible to its customer for injury to 
credit. There has, however, been a large increase in the use 
of checks and of certification in recent years. Is it today desir- 
able to rule that the holder must go through the additional for- 
mality of demanding payment in order to be entitled to recourse 
against secondary parties? Do banks have any tangible reasons 
for their position? Does their view contribute to the most 
efficient use of checks or the reverse? Do users of checks gen- 
erally understand that a refusal to certify is not a dishonor as 
refusal to pay would be? Answers to these questions can best 
be ascertained by a fact inquiry. They should be answered 
before an opinion is given. 
There are many other illustrations, some of them involving 
still other considerations. To take one of the most familiar, it 
has been held in Illinois that where a bank certifies a raised 
10 See Thorpe v. Mindeman, 123 Wis. 149, 101 N. W. 417 (1904) (the pro- 
vision was used to good effect to sustain the negotiability of a mortgage 
note containing a provision for acceleration in case of failure on the part 
of the mortgagor to pay taxes or to keep the property insured). 
1"Wachtel v. Rosen, 228 N. Y. Supp. 476 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1928); 
(1928) 38 YALE L. J. 112. 
12 Bradford v. Fox, 39 Barb. 203 (N. Y. 1863). 
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check it obligates itself to pay the holder, at least if bona fide, 
the amount of the item as it existed when certified.13 The 
statute is at least as reasonably interpreted to obligate the bank 
only to the extent of the original tenor of the instrument. The 
decision must turn largely on the general considerations in- 
volved. It may be hazarded that there is no general understand- 
ing on the point, or, if there is, that the view of banks is con- 
trary to that of holders. There is no unfair dealing involved 
on the part of the parties to the controversy, nor would one 
result more than the other clash with the ethics of the com- 
munity. Furthermore it is doubtful whether any convincing 
evidence can be obtained to show that either result would tend 
to increase or diminish the use of certified checks appreciably, 
although, so far as the writer is aware, no attempt has been 
made to investigate this, or any of the facts in the case. 
The point of greatest prominence in the case is that a loss has 
occurred through nothing that may be ascribed to the fault of 
either holder or bank. Although possible, it is no doubt im- 
practical for the parties to stipulate who should bear this risk; 
thus the convenience feature as above discussed is not a guide. 
It would seem the important consideration here would be to 
determine first which party could best avoid the loss in the 
majority of cases-whether the merchant taking the check from 
the forger, or the bank in making certification. Next in im- 
portance would be to determine whether the bank or the occa- 
sional holder could best distribute the loss.14 This again calls for 
a careful investigation of the facts. The result, whatever view 
is taken, no doubt could be stated definitely enough to obviate 
further judicial interpretation. 
The foregoing deals with only three problems that might well 
be considered in revising the statute, although, it may be said 
in passing, they have apparently as yet received little attention 
from the committee. There may well be disagreement as to 
whether the major considerations pointed out as underlying 
the decision in these few illustrations are really controlling. 
13 National City Bank v. Nat'l Bank of the Republic, 300 Ill. 103, 132 
N. E. 832 (1921). The case has been generally disapproved. See 
BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 571. 
14 It is the writer's understanding that it was the assumed answers to 
these questions which as much as any other consideration moved Pro- 
fessor Llewellyn and Professor Breckinridge to approve of the Illinois 
case, supra note 13. See Comment (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 522. The chief 
reasons stated, that the result favored the increased use of certified checks, 
and that such increase is desirable, may well be assumed. 
As further illustration Lord Mansfield's decision in Price v. Neal, 3 
Burr. 1354 (1762), putting upon the drawee the responsibility for possible 
forgery of the drawer's signature, would seem definitely, in point of fact, 
to meet the tests here suggested. 
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Certainly they are not the only considerations to be given 
weight. There may also be disagreement as to the utility of 
fact investigation, and the tacit switch from the common law 
decisions to the results of such investigations as the principal 
basis for revision. These however will serve to throw some 
light on the value of the work of the committee. And in the 
ensuing discussion of the amendments suggested by Professor 
Williston there will be further opportunity to check the value 
of the tests here set forth. 
The first series of amendments drafted by Professor Willis- 
ton was submitted to the committee at its meeting in August, 
1927, and generally approved. In July, 1928, a second draft 
modifying the first only slightly was presented to the committee 
at its Seattle meeting. Here, too, there appears to have been 
only approval of the amendments suggested, but the matter was 
tabled for one more year at which time it is expected final action 
will be taken. The list of amendments is then to be placed 
before the different state legislatures for adoption. 
Before taking up the committee's amendments in detail, a 
word is necessary as to the history of some of the principal ones. 
When the act was first drafted, and after it had been adopted in 
some four states, Dean Ames of the Harvard Law School made 
a scathing criticism of the whole project, specifying a great many 
points which he regarded as requiring amendment.15 Several 
years later, after the act had been adopted in a large number 
of states substantially as drafted, the more important of Dean 
Ames' suggestions, together with some others, were urged by 
Professor Brannan also of the Harvard Law School as necessary 
amendments to the statute.16 These were subsequently approved 
by Professor Chafee in the latest edition of Brannan, and Pro- 
fessor Williston has added his sanction by including many of 
them in the present draft of amendments. During the year Pro- 
fessor Williston's version has been approved as to policy and with 
few exceptions as to wording by Professor Kent and Professor 
Britton in very able articles.17 In fact, it may be said the chief 
criticism to date has been not of the content of the amendments, 
but of the failure of the committee to take up many other points 
thought to be equally, if not more, in need of attention.18 In 
15 The various articles growing out of this criticism are cited in the 
preface to BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at iv. 
16 Brannan, Some Necessary Amendments of the Negotiable Instruments 
Law (1913) 26 HARV, L. REV. 493. 
17 Britton, Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments 
Law (1928) 22 ILL. L. REV. 815; Kent, Some Further Necessary Amend- 
ments to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 22 ILL. L. 
REV. 833. 
18 See particularly Professor Kent's article, supra note 17, and Note 
(1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 648. 
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this latter view the writer concurs, but owing to space limita- 
tion this article will be restricted to a consideration of only 
the more important of the suggestions of the draftsman as seen 
in the light of the foregoing discussion, and will only incidentally 
deal with further suggestions. 
The first two amendments 19 suggested relate to the scope of 
the act, and in particular to the decision of the New York Court 
of Appeals in declaring interim certificates to be non-negotiable 
as not conforming to the act.20 The decision was unfor- 
tunate, and it is believed unnecessary, for, as has been pointed 
out,21 it has never been thought that the act had any bearing 
on the negotiability of instruments such as bills of lading, 
warehouse receipts and stock certificates. By definitely restrict- 
ing the act to instruments for the payment of "money," it is 
believed the result will conform to the general understanding 
and convenience of the community. 
With this added stress on the term "money," however, and 
in view of the considerable uncertainty in the common law 
decisions as to what constitutes money, some attempt should be 
made to define the word.22 It is sometimes confused with legal 
tender. There has been further some disposition to require a 
showing, in the case of items drawn in foreign currencies, that 
the currency in question actually circulates to some indefinite 
extent in the particular community.23 The problem arises in- 
creasingly in foreign trade and banking through the use of 
foreign currency paper. While the more recent judicial view 24 
inclines to sanctioning all foreign currency, viewing the fact 
that the particular item was taken as proof of circulation in 
the community, the situation is highly uncertain. The following 
is suggested by way of amendment to section 191: 
Money means any circulating media, whether legal tender or 
not, and whether circulating at par with legal tender or not, 
which have been issued as part of its currency 25 by or with the 
sanction of any government or state, domestic or foreign. 
l9 It is proposed to amend the title to read "A General Act Relating 
to Negotiable Instruments for the Payment of Money," and to amend the 
first sentence of § 1 to read "An instrument for the payment of money 
which conforms to the following requirements shall be negotiable." The 
point might well have been assumed. 
20 Manhattan Company v. Morgan, 242 N. Y. 38, 150 N. E. 594 (1926). 
21 (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 877. 
22 The uncertainty concerning the term is ably discussed in Oliphant, 
The Theory of Money in the Law of Commercial Instruments (1919) 29 
YALE L. J. 606, in which substantially the view hereinafter suggested 
is advocated. 
23 Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 191 (1873). 
24 Brown v. Perera, 183 App. Div. 892, 176 N. Y. Supp. 215 (1st Dept. 
1918), aff'g 182 App. Div. 922, 169 N. Y. Supp. 1086 (1st Dept. 1918). 
25 The litigation as to what is taxable under the Federal statute impos- 
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This should have the merit of requiring little or no further 
recourse to the courts on the point as practically all currency 
would become "money" for purposes of the act.26 Further 
there would be no need of proving in any case that the particular 
currency was in circulation in the community as money. It is 
believed that such a view would be fully in accord with the 
understanding and convenience of the financial community, whose 
operations necessarily transcend government lines. It is further 
not perceived how there could be any overreaching involved; in 
fact, quite the contrary. But in this, as with other proposals 
under consideration, there should be careful investigation of all 
aspects of the question factually. 
The fourth proposed amendment27 is to define "current funds" 
as any "circulating media" which were "lawfully and actually 
circulating at par with legal tender" when the item in question 
was issued.28 The courts have experienced considerable difficulty 
with the term "current funds." The difficulty is two-fold; 
whether an instrument so drawn is payable in money so as to 
be negotiable, and whether it calls for legal tender money or 
not. It is fairly clear that banks, who are the principal users 
of this and similar terms, intend definitely to negative the view 
ing a tax on circulating notes other than National Bank Notes should 
prove of help in reaching a fair interpretation of this definition. See 12 
U.S. C. § 562 (1927). 
26 A qualification which might reasonably be made would concern instru- 
ments both drawn in terms of foreign currencies and requiring payment 
in such media. This could be covered by amending § 6 (5), by inserting 
the word domestic so that the section would provide that the negotiable 
character of an instrument is not affected by the fact that it "Designates 
a particular kind of current domestic money in which payment is to be 
made." 
27 The third suggestion is to amend the first sentence of § 3 which reads, 
"An instrument is not negotiable which contains an order or promise to 
do any act in addition to the payment of money," by adding the proviso, 
"unless such additional act is apparently intended to render more secure 
and certain the payment of the sum of money to which the order or promise 
relates." The proviso has been criticized as altogether vague. See Britton, 
op. cit. supra note 17, at 817. In this the writer concurs. Moreover, stated 
positively, it would seem that the amendment would mean that the insertion 
of any clause which could meet this description would by that fact render 
any instrument negotiable. The provision would have no effect in the case 
of trade acceptances, which some courts, relying more on the dictum that 
a negotiable instrument is a courier without luggage than on the statute, 
have declared to be non-negotiable. See Lane Co. v. Crum, 291 S. W. 
1084 (Tex. 1927); (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 382. 
28 The amendment, which except for one change was originally sug- 
gested by Brannan, supra note 16, bristles with questions which would 
require court interpretation. For example what is means by "lawfully 
and actually." To what extent must the "circulating" take place? Will 
evidence of circulation be restricted to the day the item in question was 
issued? 
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that payment can be restricted to legal tender. The proposal 
of the committee sanctions this, but with the proviso that the 
medium used in effecting payment must have been circulating 
at par with legal tender at the time the item was issued. 
The writer is not advised what, if any, fact investigation 
serves as a basis for this qualification. With the broader defini- 
tion of money suggested above adopted, much, if not all, of the 
present court difficulty would disappear.29 The committee's quali- 
fication, however, promises to cause considerable litigation 
should it become necessary in any large number of cases to 
prove that a certain currency which has since become depre- 
ciated was, on the day the principal item was issued, circulating 
at par. Furthermore, the proposal, it is believed, will not be 
widely understood and may therefore result in many parties 
being misled. It would seem that the following provision would 
better serve the purpose, unless it be shown that the phrase 
has resulted in overreaching by the banks in a way which can 
be avoided by the means suggested: 
"The term 'currency,' 'current money' or 'current funds' means 
any domestic money." 
The next question taken up for amendment relates to whether 
a special indorsement on bearer paper should control its future 
negotiation.30 The point is one raised by Dean Ames who early 
29 This would be true, as the question whether an item drawn payable 
in "current funds" would be negotiable or not would be settled in the 
affirmative. It would not be necessary to identify current funds with legal 
tender in order to show that the instrument was payable in money. See 
Bull v. Bank, 123 U. S. 105, 112, 8 Sup. Ct. 62, 64 (1887), in which the 
court says, ". . . the term 'current funds' has been used to designate any 
of these (gold, silver or legal tender notes), all being current and declared 
by positive enactment to be legal tender." In view of such decisions, how- 
ever, it may be necessary to declare that "current funds" refers to money 
as above defined, but is not limited to legal tender money. To limit the 
item to legal tender would exclude the possibility that payment might be 
made in Federal Reserve Bank Notes, for example, which are not legal 
tender. The root of the difficulty, though, is the failure to define money. 
30 The present § 9 (5) reads: "the instrument is payable to bearer . . . 
When the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank." It is 
first proposed to add to this the sentence, "when an instrument payable 
to bearer is specially or restrictively indorsed it ceases to be payable to 
bearer and becomes payable according to the terms of the indorsement." 
It is next proposed to strike out § 40 which reads, "Where an instrument, 
payable to bearer, is indorsed specially, it may nevertheless be further 
negotiated by delivery; but the person indorsing specially is liable as 
indorser to only such holders as make title through his indorsement." 
As technical criticism of the amendment to § 9 (5), assuming its advisa- 
bility as a matter of policy, which is questioned, it may be said first that 
it leaves the status of specially indorsed paper hopelessly uncertain. Having 
ceased to be payable to bearer, and not being payable to order, it might 
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pointed out a possible conflict between sections 9(5) and 40 
of the Negotiable Instruments Law.3l It must be said, however, 
that in thirty years there has been no decision taking Dean 
Ames' view. It is entirely clear that neither the English Act, 
the common law decisions, nor, for that matter, the decisions or 
statutes in this country, allow a special indorsement to control 
the subsequent transfer of paper originally drawn payable to 
bearer. As to paper drawn to order and made payable to bearer 
by being indorsed in blank, it is believed to be equally clear that 
a special indorsement following the blank indorsement does con- 
trol subsequent transfer. To make this certain, however, all 
that would be needed by way of amendment would be to insert 
the word "originally" before the phrase "payable to bearer" in 
section 40. 
The proposed legislation would cure the supposed conflict be- 
tween section 9(5) and section 40 by taking an entirely new 
position. The result would be somewhat more symmetrical, in 
that paper originally drawn to bearer would be put on the same 
footing with paper drawn to order and endorsed in blank; but it 
is not clear that this is more than a minor consideration. As to 
the desirability of the proposal, it must be recogpized at the start 
that it will require some readjustment-especially on the part of 
drawee and collecting banks. It is fairly clear that, as is sug- 
gested by Professor Williston, to provide that a special indorse- 
ment should control the subsequent transfer both of paper 
indorsed in blank and paper originally drawn to bearer, works to 
the advantage of the holder since, if he is in possession of such 
paper he may protect his ownership by so indorsing it. But 
as to all other parties concerned, it increases the risk of deal- 
ing. For example, subsequent purchasers would run the risk of 
a forged indorsement, a risk no greater than on other types of 
indorsed paper, but one that has heretofore not existed on paper 
originally made payable to bearer. The same increased risk 
well be regarded as non-negotiable. And further, if it were to be again 
indorsed in blank what would be its status? 
31 The supposed conflict is seen by assuming that the reference to bearer 
instruments in the first part of § 40 must include blank indorsed order 
instruments which have subsequently been specially indorsed. This, in 
the face of the fact that § 9 (5), the section defining bearer instruments, 
expressly provides that an order instrument can only be treated as payable 
to bearer "when the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank," 
thus making it painfully clear, it would seem, that § 40 has no application 
to such paper. This granted, there is no conflict. To insist on the view 
that a conflict exists is to attempt to embarrass rather than assist the fair 
administration of the statute. The point would not be important except 
that Professor Williston again asserts that there is a conflict and one which 
must be corrected by amendment. In the face of this insistence it is a 
little difficult to give the other aspects of the proposed amendment a 
fair hearing. 
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applies to the maker or acceptor. At present, a payment in due 
course to any bearer is protected as a good payment.32 Of 
course, with the amendment, a payment to one holding through 
a forged indorsement might, in theory, be recovered. At the 
same time this matter of going back on a long chain of indorse- 
ments, which the amendment would make necessary, is prac- 
tically a slow and unsatisfactory procedure. As to the acceptor 
or maker, in the cases where he had learned of the forged 
indorsement before payment, it would work to his advantage 
to be given the defense that the holder might not recover as 
bearer, but these cases are relatively rare. Further it is 
odd that, although a maker may have issued his paper in 
bearer form, he should be protected in this way by the fortuitous 
circumstance that some holder might by specially indorsing it 
have changed its character to order paper.33 Probably, though, 
the great majority of cases would be made up of checks drawn 
to bearer and handled for collection. It is a much simpler pro- 
cedure for collecting banks to be relieved of indorsement troubles 
as at present on bearer items. Moreover, since the ultimate loss 
in case of forged indorsement under the proposed amendment 
would, as a practical matter, often be placed on the collecting 
bank handling the item without charge, the amendment would 
seem to bring about an unnecessarily unfair result. 
Taking a somewhat broader view of the matter, in many 
European countries the purchase in good faith and for value 
of any negotiable instrument, even though drawn to order and 
specially indorsed, operates as a transfer notwithstanding there 
may have been an intervening forged indorsement.34 In Eng- 
land by section 60 of the Bills of Exchange Act, the effect of 
forged indorsements insofar as the payment and collection of 
checks is concerned, is largely brought within the continental 
rule. The houses in this country dealing with foreign countries 
are continually having difficulty because of the different effect 
we ascribe to forged indorsements.35 Of course, if the commit- 
32 The argument is made by Brannan that the present rule as to paper 
originally drawn payable to bearer would allow payment to be made to 
an individual bearer in disregard of a "Pay any Bank or Banker" indorse- 
ment. BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 328. Of course this is misleading 
as payment must in any case, according to § 88, be made in due course; 
and to pay an unknown individual presenting bearer paper so indorsed 
could hardly be said to be a payment in good faith without notice. 
33 Although the maker were to pay his instrument, but to a person who 
had forged a special indorsement of some prior party, he could be required 
to pay again to the real owner. Practically, the payment to the forger 
might not be recoverable. It would be hard to explain to the maker, thus 
required to make double payment, that the result was entirely justified. 
34 LORENZEN, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTES 
(1919) 47. 
s5 For discussion of whether the American or European law should 
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tee is willing to advocate legislation similar to section 60 of the 
Bills of Exchange Act and possibly sections 80 and 92 relative 
to Crossed Checks, in regard to which something might well be 
done, there would be much less ground for criticism. Otherwise 
the proposed amendment would seem to be a step in the wrong 
direction. 
But before any conclusion can be had, it should be clear that 
there are a great many points that will bear investigation. The 
case would seem to fall within the principles discussed above in 
connection with the certification of raised checks; the loss, if any, 
would in each case result from a third party's wrong doing. 
Can the question, who may best avoid the loss, be answered? 
Certainly it may be said that care on the part of holders of 
such paper may obviate many losses. The proposed action would 
increase the risks of bona fide purchasers, makers, acceptors 
and collecting banks in ways that would be difficult for them 
to avoid, in order to give greater protection to the holder, how- 
ever careless he might have been. Unless there are facts not 
yet disclosed it would seem the better course to continue the 
present rule, leaving it to the holder either to refuse paper 
originally made payable to bearer or to insure against the risk 
of its loss. In this last respect, since the parties concerned 
include the whole financial community, it would seem impossible 
to say that the holder is any less able to insure against possible 
loss than the others. 
Three amendments are proposed to correct the conflict relat- 
ing to whether a payee may be a holder in due course. Of these 
the most important is that amending section 30 so as to provide 
definitely that negotiation of an order instrument may not only 
be in the usual way by indorsement completed by delivery, but 
also by delivery alone "to the person to whose order it is pay- 
able," or, more briefly stated, to the payee. It has been this 
point which has caused the most difficulty in the courts, the 
argument being that inasmuch as the definition of negotiation 
in the Act does not expressly cover delivery to the payee, it 
could not be said in such a case that there had been a negotia- 
tion to the holder as contemplated by section 52, the section 
defining holder in due course. But to make the matter doubly 
certain a further amendment has been proposed definitely men- 
tioning the payee as one who may be a holder in due course.36 
govern in the case of a transfer of a negotiable instrument abroad, see 
Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 803. 
36 The first sentence of § 52 if amended as proposed would read: "A 
holder in due course is a payee or other holder who has taken the instru- 
ment under the following conditions: . . ." (the words in italics being 
added). 
Subsection 4 of § 52 at present reads: "That at the time it was negotiated 
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There seems to be no dispute among writers but that it is desir- 
able that the payee should be accorded the protection given other 
holders taking paper in good faith and for value. 
The third amendment of this group relates to the requirement 
of delivery, which "as between immediate parties, and as re- 
gards a remote party other than a holder in due course," to use 
the language of the present section 16, "must be made either 
by or under the authority of" the maker or other party if it is 
to be effective. The proposal is to omit the phrase "as between 
immediate parties" making the sentence in part read simply, 
"as against a party other than a holder in due course ." 
The omission of the reference to "immediate parties" is desir- 
able as things now stand, in view of the uncertainty as to who 
are immediate parties, but the section as amended is not satis- 
factory. An illustration should make this clear. Suppose an 
agent acting on behalf of the maker, but in excess of what a 
court would ultimately declare to have been his apparent author- 
ity, were to deliver the paper for value to the payee. By sec- 
tions 30 and 52, if amended as above proposed, the payee would 
no doubt qualify as a holder in due course. He would have 
satisfied all requirements, if indeed he became a holder. But on 
this point, the definition is very broad and he could no doubt 
come within it, there being no forged indorsement involved. 
The result would thus be that a fundamental requirement in 
contract law, that providing for an authorized delivery between 
immediate parties, would be stricken out; a more serious defect 
than that sought to be corrected. 
There is no need of doing this much violence to the present 
rules, but at the same time it must be made clear that in cer- 
to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in 
the title of the person negotiating it." It is proposed to amend this to 
read: "that at the time he became a holder he had no notice of any infirmity 
in the instrument or that the title of the person negotiating it was defec- 
tive or that the delivery to himself was wrongful." 
The insertion in the opening sentence, although strictly unnecessary in 
view of the definition of holder, may be approved in the interest of cer- 
tainty. The remaining amendments, however, are not only unnecessary but 
undesirable. Having amended § 30 to define negotiation to include delivery 
to the payee, there was no need to substitute "became a holder" for the 
present wording. The attempt is apparently to re-describe in § 52 (4) 
what has already been done in § 30. This in itself is undesirable. Further, 
the phrase "or that the delivery to himself was wrongful" would add a 
new test which every holder, whether payee or not, would have to satisfy 
hereafter to become a holder in due course. And what is meant by wrong- 
ful? As the writer has pointed out elsewhere the clause would also con- 
fuse the interpretation of § 14 inasmuch as it appears to have set up 
two types of holders in due course: those to whom the item has been 
negotiated and those to whom it may have been delivered. Book Review 
(1926) 36 YALE L. J. 158, 159. It would be better to leave the subsection 
in its present form. 
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tain situations, at least, the payee and maker, to use but one 
illustration, are not to be regarded as immediate parties. The 
direct way would seem to be to leave the section as it is now 
worded, defining "immediate parties" to make the point clear, 
a matter which should be covered in any case if the term is to 
be used later in the act as has been suggested. The writer would 
favor making the right of recovery by the holder, whether he 
be payee or subsequent indorsee, depend, in the case of unau- 
thorized delivery by an agent, on whether the party receiving 
the instrument knew or had reason to know of the agency.37 
In other words no adequate reason has been advanced for tak- 
ing from the maker the defense of unauthorized delivery in 
cases where the taker knew he was dealing with a representa- 
tive. On the other hand where the agent purports to be owner 
of the paper, and the taker is reasonable in assuming him to be 
owner, the defense of unauthorized delivery should be cut off. 
Professor Moore's argument relative to so-called remittance paper 
is another way of illustrating the point.38 That is, when a payee 
or indorsee takes a bank draft or other instrument of the re- 
mittance type from a supposed owner who is, however, not a 
party, the payee should be given as much protection as would 
be accorded an indorsee. It is doubtful whether the rule should 
be limited to so-called remittance paper, as the form of the in- 
strument would seem to be important primarily to show that 
the holder acted in good faith in assuming the one in possession 
of it to be an owner. Moreover, even though remittance paper 
is purchased, if it is taken from a known agent, who in fact 
exceeded his authority, there is no point in protecting the pur- 
chaser. 
As to the possibility of accurately defining immediate parties 
so as to reflect this distinction, the following is tentatively 
suggested: 
"Immediate parties" refers to any party whose signature 
appears on the instrument, and the next subsequent party to 
whom it is delivered, unless it is delivered by a third person, 
and the party receiving the instrument did not know or have 
reason to know that the third person held the instrument as 
agent or other representative of the first party. Where delivery 
is made by one of several joint signers, not partners, only the 
signer making delivery and the party receiving the instrument 
are immediate parties. 
The exception in the first sentence is to provide for the usual 
payee as holder in due course situation, and equally for the simi- 
37 For a careful analysis of the different situations in which the problem 
may arise, see Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 1005. 
3s Moore, The Right of the Remitter of a Bill or Note (1920) 20 COL. 
L. REV. 749. 
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lar problem when delivery is made by a third person to a special 
indorsee. The second sentence is designed to resolve all doubts, 
for example, in the co-maker situation. It seems to go rather far, 
in fact to the extent that would apparently obtain in all cases 
under the proposed amendment to section 16. But in the case of 
accommodation makers who, for example, may have given the 
paper to the principal debtor on condition that other signers be 
obtained, the delivery to the lender who takes it in good faith 
should be conclusive. Otherwise it would be necessary to insist 
that the paper be made to order of the debtor and indorsed, or 
to inquire of each signer before taking the paper whether there 
were defenses, both somewhat cumbersome. As to signers who 
are actual parties to the transaction with the payee, the situation 
itself should afford them sufficient protection in their opportun- 
ity to attack the good faith of the payee and thus his standing 
as holder in due course. 
Another problem 39 sought to be resolved by amendment relates 
to whether a maker who signs a note for the accommodation of 
the payee may be held liable should the instrument not be sold 
until after maturity. The Act at present does not expressly 
cover the point, although it provides in section 29 that "such a 
person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwith- 
standing such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew 
him to be only an accommodation party." This could be con- 
strued as meaning merely that the element of notice should not 
defeat recovery assuming the holder in other respects should 
be a bona fide purchaser for value before maturity. On the 
other hand many courts have ruled that the term "holder for 
value" controls, and have allowed recovery even where the in- 
strument was not negotiated by the accommodated party until 
after maturity.4 
In this situation Professor Williston has suggested that the sec- 
tion be amended to provide that if the maker did not intend a 
transfer after maturity, the negotiation should be regarded as "a 
breach of faith." Obviously this fails of its purpose if you ask 
what are the consequences of such a breach of faith, a matter not 
provided for. It has always been supposed, although no cases 
are at hand, that if the holder, even a holder for value, had 
notice of defenses, he would not be entitled to recover of the 
39 It is also proposed to amend § 23 to read: "when the signature of a 
person is forged or made without authority it is inoperative to render him 
liable or to transfer his rights under the instrument unless he is pre- 
cluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority." 
This amendment probably makes no change in the law and would seem 
to be unnecessary although the proposed wording is to be preferred to 
the former which declared that a forged or unauthorized signature is 
"wholly inoperative." 
40 See discussion in (1926) 24 MICH. L. REV. 847. 
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accommodation maker. This is consistent with the view ad- 
vocated by Brannan, that "holder for value" in the present 
section should read "holder in due course." 41 The proposed 
amendment could quite reasonably be interpreted, however, as 
meaning merely that the maker might sue the payee for the 
breach of faith, saying nothing as to whether a holder for value 
purchasing the instrument after maturity without notice of such 
breach could recover or not. The situation in need of amend- 
ment would thus be unchanged. 
The unknown quantity in the case is as to what the maker 
understands his contract to be. Does he intend that he shall 
be obligated in case of negotiation after maturity? If he does 
so intend, obviously the holder in due course requirement would 
be unsatisfactory as a purchaser after maturity could not qualify. 
It would seem to be necessary to make a thorough investigation 
of what business people think is, or should be the proper view, 
thus insuring as far as possible that the result will accord with 
general understanding and convenience. Perhaps such an in- 
quiry would show that ordinarily negotiation after maturity 
is not intended. If so, this view no doubt should be codified, 
but if a maker were to intend that negotiation could be had 
after maturity as well as before, it should be left clear that 
the purchaser in such case, although not a holder in due 
course, would be entitled to recover, a possibility probably 
precluded by the wording of Brannan's suggestion. If this 
view were to be sustained by the facts, it would seem better 
draftsmanship to omit all reference in section 29 concerning 
the obligation of the accommodation party to one or another 
holder, making it cover merely the effect of notice of accommo- 
dation signing. The following is suggested: 
Although a holder may have known at the time of taking the 
instrument that such person was only an accommodation party 
such knowledge shall not constitute notice of any infirmity in 
the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. 
The next two amendments,42 taken in order as drafted, refer 
to the status of bank notes and demand certificates of deposit 
under the Act. The first, an amendment to section 53, is de- 
signed to make sure that a purchase of such an instrument may 
be made at any time, thus avoiding the possibility that a pur- 
chaser might be said to have taken subject to defenses. As to 
bank notes, the amendment is harmless but of little value as it 
41 Brannan, op. cit. supra note 16, at 494-500. 
42 It is also proposed to amend § 37 to provide in effect that a restrictive 
indorsee for account of a third party may qualify as holder in due course. 
The amendment corrects an error in the present act and should be approved. 
Section 47 is also amended to conform. 
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is inconceivable that any court at any time under any circum- 
stances would have ruled that one taking bank notes, or in 
other words money, should by reason of this hold the instrument 
subject to claims of prior holders. As to demand certificates 
of deposit, which of course may well be outstanding for a con- 
siderable period, it would seem the present reasonable time 
requirement is sufficiently elastic to allow of full justice being 
done.43 Certainly no reason in decision or fact is advanced for 
the position taken by the proposed amendment, that a bank 
should be entirely deprived of this defense, one common to others 
issuing demand instruments. Obviously if due allowance is 
made for what should constitute a reasonable time under the 
circumstances, as we may trust the courts to do, the amendment 
is not necessary ordinarily for the protection of holders. 
The other of these two suggested amendments would make 
section 70 of the Negotiable Instruments Law read: 
"Presentment for payment is not necessary, except in the case 
of bank notes and certificates of deposit, in order to charge the 
person primarily liable on the instrument." 
This point also is one which in thirty years has caused no 
difficulty in the courts. It was first suggested by Dean Ames, 
and has been approved by all subsequent commentators, except 
Brewster who appears to have thought the point somewhat 
academic. The wording of the amendment as it now appears 
was proposed by Brannan.44 
There is probably no disagreement with the evident purpose 
of this amendment, assuming that it is necessary. It is inter- 
esting though to see how it may most plausibly be construed 
if adopted as now drafted. It is fair to state in the language 
of the section, if amended as proposed, that hereafter present- 
ment would be necessary to charge the bank on a bank note or 
certificate of deposit. That being so, what constitutes due pre- 
sentment. This is evidently provided for by section 71, the 
next section, and by it, for example, the holder of a 30 day 
certificate of deposit would be required to present for payment 
on the maturity date to charge the bank, an absurd result. 
The difficulty lies in failing to distinguish between present- 
ment to charge secondary parties, and the pleading rule requir- 
43 The present § 53 provides, as to all types of demand instruments, that 
if they are negotiated an unreasonable time after issue, the holder is 
not deemed a holder in due course. The amendment would sanction negotia- 
tion at an unreasonable time after issue. Thus, in case a bank were induced 
by fraud to issue a certificate of deposit, as in the case of a deposit of 
forged paper, there would no longer be any restriction as to the time 
within which the certificate must be negotiated in order that the purchaser 
could become a holder in due course. 
44BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 630. 
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ing demand in certain cases before suit may be had. It should 
be evident from the above, however, that even in the case of 
bank notes and certificates of deposit no presentment is neces- 
sary, just as the section provides, in order to charge the bank. 
At the same time, the Act does not affect in any way the quite 
different matter as to whether demand must be made as a pre- 
requisite to suit, nor is there any provision as to what should 
constitute a due demand for such purpose. It is general infor- 
mation that demand by telephone for example would satisfy the 
pleading requirement though it would not satisfy the present- 
ment rules.45 
While the two amendments proposed would seem to be imma- 
terial, if not actually undesirable, the situation in other respects 
is not entirely free from doubts which might well be clarified. 
Of these the first relates to the proceedings necessary to charge 
indorsers on either time or demand certificates of deposit. By 
section 71 presentment for payment would seem to be necessary; 
in the case of time certificates, at maturity, and, as to demand 
items, within a reasonable time after their issue. To the writer, 
in view of the peculiar status of certificates of deposit as above 
discussed, it is doubtful whether presentment of time certificates 
should be required strictly on the maturity day as apparently 
is the rule of the statute. Again there is considerable uncer- 
tainty in the decisions as to when the statute of limitations 
commences in the case of time certificates of deposit; whether 
at the maturity date or at the time of making demand.46 Further 
in the case of demand certificates, if it be granted that the 
statute does not start running until the demand is made, should 
there not be some limitation, as for example twenty years, after 
which such a demand would be too late? Any of these three 
difficulties if resolved satisfactorily would be an actual contri- 
bution to the present statute. 
The next amendment proposed by Professor Williston would 
alter section 71 so as to reverse the present practice as to present- 
ment of demand paper. The present rule as to the indorsers of a 
demand instrument other than a bill of exchange is that "pre- 
sentment must be made within a reasonable time after its issue," 
or the indorser will be discharged from all responsibility. The 
rule concerning indorsers and drawers of demand bills is that 
presentment "will be sufficient if made within a reasonable time 
after the last negotiation thereof." In the case of checks, which 
for most purposes are regarded as demand bills of exchange, it 
45 As to the inadequacy of presentment by telephone, see Robinson v. 
Lancaster Foundry Co., 152 Md. 81, 136 Atl. 58 (1927); (1927) 37 YALE 
L. J. 258. 
46 For general discussion of the problem see 2 PATON, DIGEST (1926) 
1056a. 
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is specially provided, however, that the drawer is discharged, 
but only to the extent of the loss, in case presentment of the 
instrument is not made "within a reasonable time after its 
issue." 47 
The difficulty has been the technical one of reconciling these 
provisions, and the practical one of justifying the distinctions 
made. The most apparent discrepancy is that a situation may 
exist where the drawer of a check, because of late presentment, 
will be discharged, at least to the extent of the loss, while the 
presentment may yet have been in time to charge the holder's 
indorser.48 In other words, presentment may be made an un- 
reasonable time after issue, and yet within a reasonable time 
after the last negotiation. The proposed amendment abandons 
the "reasonable time after the last negotiation" test entirely, 
substituting as to drawers the "reasonable time after issue" test 
provided for in the case of drawers of checks. This is good 
policy, but as to indorsers, it is proposed to go back thirty years 
to the common law decisions, and provide that presentment of an 
instrument to charge indorsers must be made "within a reason- 
able time after its indorsement." 
If we are to consult the convenience and understanding of the 
business community, it is believed that very little justification 
can be found for reversing the present rule as to indorsers of 
demand paper (other than bills of exchange), that is, for aban- 
doning the reasonable time after issue test, in favor of the 
reasonable time after indorsement test. In fact it is doubtful 
if there is any reason, satisfactory to the users of negotiable 
instruments, why any difference should be made between drawers 
and indorsers in the premises. The writer is very much inclined 
to the view that only one test should be applied and that is the 
reasonable time after issue formula. To affect this all that would 
be necessary would be to amend the act as has been done in some 
states so that this section would read in part, "where it is pay- 
able on demand, presentment must be made within a reasonable 
time after its issue." 49 This has the merit of ready application. 
47 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 186. 
48 Columbian Banking Co. v. Bowen, 134 Wis. 218, 114 N. W. 451 (1908). 
49 This is the Nebraska provision. Apparently similar legislation obtains 
in Vermont. BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 638. 
The criticism is made that this would not cover the case of time instru- 
ments indorsed after maturity, in that it would be impossible to present 
within a reasonable time after the issuance of the instrument to charge 
indorsers; also, that a demand note might well be indorsed an unreasonable 
time aTter its issue, again as to the indorser apparently making it im- 
possible to comply with the reasonable time after issue test for present- 
ment. Brannan, op. cit. supra note 1, at 645. As to the first, the com- 
mon law theory was that the after maturity indorsement was similar to 
a new drawing and obviously presentment could be made within a reason- 
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It is the present rule and may be assumed to be reasonably well 
understood. The proposed course would necessitate re-litigating 
the whole question as to what is meant today by a reasonable 
time after an endorsement. 
Of perhaps more importance, would be a study of modern 
decisions and practices in order to state, if possible, a definite 
time within which presentment should be made in the cases in- 
vestigated, or at least in many of the more important ones. 
That this can be done is proved by the fact that courts are con- 
tinually called upon to undertake the task, and in fact have 
practically crystallized the rule with regard to the presentment 
of checks, where all parties are in the same city.50 It would 
seem quite possible that with the greater time and opportunity 
to investigate all phases of the question, the committee could 
satisfactorily state several such rules in definite terms to square 
with present requirements.51 The additional gain to follow from 
the increased definiteness would easily offset the theoretical 
justice found in the flexibility of the present reasonable time 
rule. 
The next amendments proposed by Professor Williston con- 
cern the discharge of an instrument, now dealt with in sec- 
tion 119, and the discharge of secondary parties, at present 
covered by section 120. The position taken in each case 
is again substantially that advocated by Dean Ames in his 
original criticism of the act, a position,, it must be said, which 
appears to have been seconded by most of the writers on the 
subject. The basis of Dean Ames' argument seems to have been, 
however, merely that the law as expounded by common-law 
judges was different from the interpretation of the sections 
which he thought necessary. And from all that appears none 
of the subsequent writers has made an independent investigation 
from the facts as to the desirability of either position. While 
Dean Ames' attitude in the matter was perhaps right enough 
some thirty years ago when the chief end was merely codifica- 
tion, especially as his criticism was made to bring about revision 
before the Act had been widely adopted, it is obviously highly 
able time thereafter. This result should reasonably obtain inasmuch as 
§ 7 probably codifies the common law theory. The second point might well 
be covered directly by amending § 7 so that it would read substantially as 
follows: "Where an instrument is issued, accepted or indorsed when over- 
due, or indorsed more than a reasonable time after its issue if payable, 
otherwise than at a fixed or determinable future time, it is, as regards 
the person so issuing, accepting or indorsing it, deemed equivalent to a 
new instrument payable on demand." 
50 For example, see Grange v. Reigh, 93 Wis. 552, 67 N. W. 1130 (1898). 
51 The state of South Dakota has adopted definite time legislation dis- 
tinguishing between interest and non-interest bearing demand notes and 
bills. See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 926. 
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undesirable to attempt today to write out the thirty years of 
intervening experience without the most careful consideration. 
The point is illustrated by the proposed treatment of section 
120.52 It has been recommended that subsection 3, which now 
provides, in effect, that secondary parties, for example indorsers, 
are discharged "by the discharge of a prior party," should be 
entirely omitted. Dean Ames thought the provision was too 
broad since he considered that it might include a discharge by the 
statute of limitations or possibly by a bankruptcy discharge. 
This position has not been sanctioned by any court and, it is 
believed, is no longer maintained; it being understood the pro- 
vision relates to discharges granted by the holder. It was further 
urged, although again no court has taken the position, that 
should a holder fail to charge a prior party, for instance by 
neglecting to give him due notice of dishonor, this too would be 
a discharge within the subsection, and would constitute a dis- 
charge of intervening parties. There would seem to be no danger 
at all that this view would ever be adopted by any responsible 
court.53 
It is interesting to consider the legalistic situation which would 
follow if the subsection were to be omitted as proposed. Faced 
with a case involving an actual discharge, for example, of the 
52 The present § 120 reads: 
"A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged: 
1. By any act which discharges the instrument; 
2. By the intentional cancellation of his signature by the holder; 
3. By the discharge of a prior party; 
4. By a valid tender of payment made by a prior party; 
5. By a release of the principal debtor, unless the holders right of 
recourse against the party secondarily liable is expressly reserved; 
6. By any agreement binding upon the holder to extend the time of 
payment, or to postpone the holder's right to enforce the instrument, unless 
made with the assent of the party secondarily liable, or unless the right 
of recourse against such party is expressly reserved." 
53 A further point is made against the subsection because of its possi- 
ble application to a situation involving an accommodation maker. See 
BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 752. Here, should the holder discharge 
the accommodation maker, the subsection would seem to operate to dis- 
charge an indorser even though he was the principle debtor, a result 
described by Dean Ames to be "shocking and contrary to all the decisions." 
Conceding the point for purposes of argument, the remedy is not to omit 
the subsection, but to add a proviso similar to that found in subsections 
5 and 6, that is, that secondary parties are discharged by the discharge 
of a prior party, unless the right of recourse against such secondary parties 
is expressly reserved. It is the writer's experience that there are many 
occasions in practice when it would be decidedly convenient to be able 
to discharge one or another of the parties to a negotiable instrument with- 
out thereby discharging the others. It is not believed it would work to 
the disadvantage of any party. If this provision were added there would 
be little force left in the objection and, it is believed, the act would be 
definitely improved. 
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first indorser by release, what should a court rule as to the 
status of intervening indorsers? Presumably, if the repeal of 
the subsection were to be given any weight whatever, such 
parties would no longer be discharged-a result wholly out of 
harmony with the present business understanding. It is not 
possible simply to repeal the subsection and thereby be sure that 
forty-eight states will go back to the common law decisions, even 
if it were at all desirable, a point not in any way sustained. 
But to proceed, it is proposed also to omit subsections 5 and 6 
of section 120, providing respectively for discharge of secondary 
parties in case of a release of the principal debtor or of an 
extension of time being given, without recourse in either case 
being reserved against such parties.54 The hope, apparently, 
is that by this means the courts will start again where they 
left off before the act was adopted. But even assuming this, 
no excuse whatever is advanced for omitting these provisions, 
at least, as they apply in the great majority of cases-those not 
involving accommodation parties. Surely it cannot seriously be 
recommended today that this codification, which to this extent 
has proven quite successful, should be abandoned for conflicting, 
uncertain and not necessarily satisfactory rules of suretyship, 
which it is assumed would apply inasmuch as an indorser's con- 
tract is a specialized form of suretyship. The argument, that 
inasmuch as the Act only inadequately codifies the suretyship 
rules it should include none of them, is not impressive. More- 
over, no rule which the writer regards as of much practical 
importance in this situation has been specified as having been 
omitted, except the rule having to do with the effect of a release 
of collateral by the holder.55 It would seem to be far better to 
provide for this case, and also to adopt such other rules as are 
shown to be essential, than to take the proposed action, unless of 
54 The provision allowing a holder to preserve his recourse against 
secondary parties in these two cases has, it is believed, proven satisfactory. 
The argument for it is that it is decidedly convenient in many cases and 
probably in most will make no comparable difference to the parties against 
whom recourse is reserved. The suretyship rules which would obtain 
if these two subsections were to be stricken out would not admit of this 
possibility. While the scheme may no doubt be criticised as requiring 
an apparently meaningless formality on the part of the holder and as 
being uncertain as to what constitutes an express reservation of recourse, 
it meets the test of convenience and is, it is believed, reasonably well 
understood. 
55 The related problem as to whether a bank holding a depositor's instru- 
ment at maturity must apply his account in order to hold indorsers might 
also be covered. As to the many questions in suretyship concerning the 
effect on the surety's contract of changes in the agreement with the princi- 
pal debtor, it is believed many of the refinements involved in this question 
have no place in negotiable instrument law and where important are 
covered by § 124 concerning the effect of material alterations. 
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course the committee wishes to abandon the idea of a uniform 
body of negotiable instruments law. 
The more substantial criticism of the discharge sections re- 
lates to section 119, and applies only when one of the parties 
has signed for accommodation, or in other words as a "surety." 
It appears to have been the scheme of the Act to make no dis- 
tinction between the contract of an accommodation indorser and 
that of an indorser selling the instrument for value. The same 
proceedings upon dishonor must be taken in the one case as in 
the other. And in the matter of discharge likewise no distinction 
was made. It is believed that where the accommodation party 
has signed as drawer or indorser, this has fully met with the 
convenience and understanding of those using commercial paper. 
But when the accommodation signer, instead of appearing in 
a secondary capacity, signs as maker or acceptor for the accom- 
modation of the payee, or as a co-maker, there has been difficulty. 
As a primary party it would seem such a signer would not, by 
virtue of section 119,56 be entitled to discharge: for example, 
in event of an extension of time being granted to an indorser 
who might be the principal debtor. The great majority of 
courts, moreover, have construed the section to state the exclusive 
grounds for discharge in the case of primary parties and have 
thus refused to allow the suretyship defenses.57 The result has 
been almost unanimously disapproved.58 
It seems to the writer that the criticism of the result reached 
by the majority courts looks no farther than to see that the 
result is inconsistent with suretyship cases. If one consults 
the users of such paper, however, it is believed it will appear 
that they definitely understand that a greater obligation is 
incurred by an accommodation party signing as maker than as 
indorser, a difference not explainable merely by virtue of the 
fact that in one capacity the signer is entitled to notice of dis- 
honor, while in the other he is not. Moreover, from the stand- 
point of convenience, it would seem much better engineering to 
afford two possible courses in the accommodation situation; that 
is, to continue the result reached in most states today, thus mak- 
56 The present § 119 reads: "A negotiable instrument is discharged: 
1. By payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor; 
2. By payment in due course by the party accommodated, where the 
instrument is made or accepted for accommodation; 
3. By the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder; 
4. By any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the 
payment of money; 
5. When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument 
at or after maturity in his own right." 
57 The cases are cited in BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 721, principal 
space being devoted to the few cases tending to take the other view. 
58 Ibid. 723. 
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ing it possible to extinguish the suretyship rules where the accom- 
modation party signs as maker, while leaving open the possibility 
that the signer, if that is his bargain, may go on the paper as 
indorser, with the increased protection accorded him in that 
capacity. This is especially true inasmuch as even where the 
signing is in a secondary capacity a great percentage of accom- 
modation signers today, measured in amount of obligations, will 
be comprised of officers or stockholders of corporations, who sign 
for their company, or companies signing for a subsidiary, in 
neither of which situations are the refinements of common law 
suretyship particularly appropriate. Quite obviously there is 
much room in any event for a thorough fact investigation before 
any change whatever is approved. The one suggested would be 
worse than the rules now existing. 
It is also proposed in this connection to omit subsection 4 of 
section 119.59 The reason for this action originated with Dean 
Ames, since in his opinion the wording "by any other act which 
will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money" was 
entirely too broad. In his view a payment before maturity could 
even be said to come within the section so that if the instrument 
by some means were thereafter to be negotiated to a holder in 
due course, the latter might not recover. This view has not 
been taken by the courts.60 It has been considered that the 
subsection applies merely as between the parties. 
The confusion appears to be brought about because of the 
uncertainty as to whether or not a discharge of this character 
should rank as a real defense. As the section probably is other- 
wise limited to real defenses, the question might be clarified by 
inserting a provision limiting the application of the subsection 
to acts occurring after maturity. Thus the subsection might 
well read, "By any other act at or after maturity which would 
discharge a simple contract for the payment of money." Cer- 
tainly a release by the holder of the party primarily liable given 
at or after maturity should rank as a complete discharge,6 and, 
59 Supra note 53. 
6 BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 742. 
61 To make sure that, as between the parties, a release or other dis- 
charge would still be effective, it is proposed to add the following sentence 
to § 120: 
"As between immediate parties any defense is effectual which would 
be a defense to a simple contract for the payment of money." 
It is doubted that any provision is necessary to accomplish the supposed 
purpose of the committee. The proposed action, however, is indefinite 
in its use of "immediate parties" without definition. And what of a re- 
lease by a remote party? 
A still more serious objection, perhaps, would arise in case an indorsee 
claiming to be a holder in due course were to sue his indorser. At present 
the act would admit of the indorser showing that the indorsee did not qualify 
as holder in due course and, when shown, allow any defense good in the 
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if there is any doubt whether this comes within the subsection 
relating to payment as discharge, it would be unwise to omit 
subsection 4 limited as suggested.62 
Another flaw, or supposed flaw, in the act to be remedied is 
the possibility that in event of an accidental alteration or spoli- 
ation the instrument would be discharged-a position maintained 
as a reasonable, in fact necessary, interpretation of the present 
section by all writers from Dean Ames on, but not sustained 
to any important extent by the courts. In fact the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, within the year, has had before 
it a striking case which illustrates this. There, a £500 note was 
accidently altered when the clothing in which it had been left was 
washed. The opinion discussed at considerable length whether 
a material alteration occurring in this way should avoid the in- 
strument, under section 64 of the Bills of Exchange Act, which 
was substantially copied in section 124 of the American Act. 
In holding that the section did not include such alterations the 
court stated that: 
"Both the history of the law which this section enunciates and 
the terms of the section itself show that it relates only to alter- 
ations effected by the will of the person by whom or under whose 
directions they are made, and that it does not apply to a change 
due to pure accident." 63 
case of a non-negotiable instrument, whatever that may be. The new 
sentence would reach this position at once-a much broader proposition; 
probably negativing much of the law peculiar to negotiable instruments. 
62 The serious question in these payment cases, and one not touched 
upon by the committee, relates to accelerated instruments paid before their 
fixed maturity date. Should a subsequent purchaser unaware of such facts 
be protected? The same situation is presented in the case of instruments 
payable "on or before" a fixed date. And, in the case of demand instru- 
ments paid and subsequently wrongfully put into circulation, the situation 
is not clear, although in the analogous case of omission to give due notice 
of dishonor followed by sale to a bona fide purchaser the latter is pro- 
tected. It is suggested as a partial answer to these problems that sub- 
stantially the following be added to § 88, the section defining payment 
in due course: 
Payment of an instrument drawn payable on or before, or whose maturity 
date may be accelerated before, a fixed or determinable future time, if 
made prior to such time, or of an instrument payable otherwise than at 
a fixed or determinable future time, before a reasonable time after its 
issue has elapsed, shall be in due course only if the payment is indorsed 
on the instrument or the instrument is delivered up to the party making 
payment. 
There are obviously many questions as to the desirability of legislating 
in this fashion. These should be carefully considered. But the point 
is real and of much more importance than the practically non-existing 
difficulty with § 119 (4). 
63 Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Lo Lee Shi, [1928] 
A. C. 181. See the able discussion of the case in (1928) 44 L. Q. REV. 
401, in which it is suggested that, while the result is satisfactory, it may 
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It is proposed to cover the point expressly, however, by amend- 
ing section 124 to read in part, "Where a negotiable instrument 
is fraudulently and materially altered by the rightful owner .. . 
it is avoided .. ." The italicized words would be added to the 
present section. It has been pointed out that nobody knows 
who is a "rightful owner," 64 and the term, holder, is probably 
to be preferred. But a more serious criticism is apparent 
when you ask what will happen hereafter if a remote holder, 
for example, were to agree with the maker to change the interest 
rate. The alteration would be material but it could hardly be 
said to be fraudulent. What would be the result as to indorsers 
not assenting to the change? A court might well assume that 
the amended section was intended to change the prior law and 
thus reach the result that such an alteration would no longer 
constitute a discharge. If this were to follow, and it would 
seem to be almost a necessary conclusion from the language used, 
it would be better here, too, to leave the section in its present 
form. 
The discussion discloses, however, a further purpose which 
the present section 124 serves, which would be equally de- 
feated if it were amended as proposed. One of the points on 
which the act was attacked by Dean Ames was that the surety- 
ship rule, providing for discharge of surety in case of subsequent 
change in the principal agreement, was not adequately codified 
by section 120 discussed above. But changes would ordinarily 
have to be made on the instrument if the maker were to be 
protected and in such case the present section would be effective 
usually to declare secondary parties discharged in accordance 
with the suretyship rule. The section does this without at the 
same time burdening negotiable instruments law with the many 
fine distinctions as to what would be a material change in the 
principal agreement. 
The responsibility to be imposed on a drawee, who destroys or 
refuses to return on demand a bill of exchange left with him for 
the twenty-four hour period provided in the act for acceptance, 
has given rise to another difference of opinion. At the time 
the act was drafted, several states, including New York, 
had statutes providing that such action should count as an ac- 
ceptance. The rule at common law was that it amounted to a 
conversion, thus making it necessary for the holder in each case 
to prove the value of the instrument before he might recover. 
The draftsmen of the act adopted the statutory rule which they 
found had proven to be a practical working rule. But to call 
a refusal to accept an acceptance was to Dean Ames a "perver- 
not be sound historically as a question of law, although the situation might 
well be one in which an equity court would have intervened. 
6 Britton, op. cit. supra note 17, at 828. 
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sion of language," 65 and the proposed amendment compromises 
by calling it a conversion, but one for which the damages are 
fixed at the face value of the instrument. 
In most cases it would seem utterly immaterial whether the 
term "acceptance" or "conversion" be used, if the recovery is to 
be the same in either event. If called an acceptance, however, it 
is clear that no recourse could be had against the secondary 
parties until the item should be presented and dishonored for 
non-payment. But as this is exactly what the holder and sec- 
ondary parties bargained for, it would seem entirely just. As to 
the position of the drawee, if he were required to pay as "accep- 
tor," he might readily recover of the drawer, but as a "converter" 
his position might well be doubtful. This is an unnecessary 
result-if merely to cure a "perversion of language"-and should 
not be brought about except on a showing of practical necessity. 
Moreover, the present section has been quite reasonably inter- 
preted to require an intentional destruction in order to constitute 
an acceptance.65 The amended section might well be so construed 
but to say unqualifiedly that it constitutes a conversion is to 
court the possibility of misinterpretation. 
In the courts the difficulty with the section has been two-fold: 
first, in failing to note that there must be a refusal to return the 
instrument in order that the retention of it should amount to 
an acceptance; next, that the section has no application to items 
left for payment. These points are easily cleared up; in fact 
they have already been corrected in one or two of the states 
where they have caused difficulty.67 But the draftsman proposes 
to go much farther and to make the section apply to any item 
left with a drawee, whether for acceptance, certification, or pay- 
ment.68 As it now stands the amended section would produce 
the somewhat remarkable result, at least by implication, that 
the drawee of a check might have twenty-four hours in which 
to certify or pay.69 But even if this were corrected, it seems 
65 BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 838. 
66 Bailey & Co. v. S. W. Veneer Co., 132 Ark. 63, 200 S. W. 280 (1918). 
67 BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 839. 
68The section as amended would read: 
"Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance, certification, 
or payment destroys the same, or refuses on demand made after the expira- 
tion of twenty-four hours after such delivery or such longer period as the 
holder has allowed, to return the bill accepted or non-accepted to the holder, 
the drawee will be deemed to have dishonored and converted the bill and 
shall be liable in damages for the amount thereof." 
69 There would seem to be no point in putting a twenty-four hour pro- 
vision in § 137 inasmuch as it is definitely provided in § 136 that the drawee 
has that much time in which to accept. It obviously has no application to 
items left for certification or payment. And even as to bills left for 
acceptance, if they are destroyed or redelivery is refused within twenty- 
four hours, why should not the drawee be obligated? He might have 
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very doubtful whether every drawee destroying or failing to 
return on demand a worthless item presented for payment should 
be required to pay its face value to the holder. 
It is suggested that the section be amended to read as follows: 
Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance, 
destroys the same or refuses to return the bill accepted or non- 
accepted to the holder pursuant to demand, he will be deemed 
to have accepted the same. This section does not apply to checks 
nor to any instrument presented for payment or certification. 
It is believed that this would cure all the conflict encountered 
at present in the courts. Moreover, it would preserve the com- 
mon law rule that the destruction of an instrument presented 
for payment would be a conversion, but not one for which the 
penalty is fixed at the face value of the instrument, as now 
proposed. In fact it is doubtful whether there is any occasion for 
legislating as to items left for payment or certification as there is 
no custom to leave items in this way, similar to the twenty- 
four hour practice in the case of bills left for acceptance. Only 
in the case of the present practice of collecting banks in routing 
items by mail directly to the drawee for payment would the 
situation arise. As to this, the Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws voted at their last meeting to commence work on the 
drafting of a uniform bank collection statute. The American 
Bankers' Association, it appears, are also working on proposed 
legislation of this character. If found desirable to add this 
additional protection to the practice of handling collection items 
in this way, some provision limited to the needs of the case 
might well be inserted in that legislation. If so, it should ob- 
viously not only apply to items sent to drawees, but to all types 
of collection items, whether negotiable or non-negotiable, and 
whether sent to drawees or other parties. 
Only one other proposed amendment is left for consideration. 
The present section 186 provides that, 
"A check must be presented for payment within a reasonable 
time after its issue, or the drawer will be discharged from lia- 
bility thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." 
It was the Ames-Brannan contention that inasmuch as the 
section did not also provide for notice of dishonor, the drawer 
would be entirely discharged in case of failure to give notice.70 
returned the bill unaccepted and inasmuch as he had not been given twenty- 
four hours as provided it should not count as a dishonor. 
70 Since checks are to be regarded as bills of exchange as provided in § 
185, it would seem that the act requires protest also in the case of a check 
drawn in one state on a bank in another. If so, the point should be 
covered. 
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Consequently it has been proposed to amend the section by add- 
ing after the word "issue," the following: "and notice of dis- 
honor must be given to the drawer, as provided for in the case 
of bills of exchange, or the .. ." 
The purport of this amendment would be to legislate that, 
save for the situation where the drawee bank fails, causing loss, 
there is no requirement either to present or to give notice at 
any time.71 To continue the drawer's responsibility in the case 
of delayed presentment is to recognize that ordinarily he is the 
principal debtor.72 To use Dean Ames' favorite type of illustra- 
tion, however, what would happen under the proposed wording 
in case the drawer happened to be an accommodation party? 
Should he not be entitled to notice in case the item was in 
fact duly presented but dishonored? The present section would 
provide an absolute discharge in this case. But despite this 
possible hardship it is believed the section, as amended, has much 
to commend it. 
It remains only to make a few comments applicable to this 
case and, indeed, applicable to the entire project. It should be 
apparent that there are many points of view from which the 
present suggested amendments may be considered. While the 
present discussion has dwelt to some extent on supposed tech- 
nical points of faulty wording, or again on whether many of 
the amendments are very material today, this has been only 
incidental. The principal question should be as to the reasons 
of policy which should be given chief weight; first, in drafting 
amendments already under consideration and next, in selecting 
other points in need of amendment. 
The writer knows of no better way of ascertaining what con- 
stitutes good policy than to make as thorough an investigation 
from the fact side as time and money available will permit. It is, 
of course, of little help merely to consult the supposed function 
of a check, for example, or for that matter of negotiable paper in 
general, in order to reach a position. Such an effort assumes 
the point in issue. It would seem necessary, rather, to break up 
the question into separate factors, which it is assumed should 
71 Probably still it would be necessary to present in order to commence 
suit. 
72 That this is the matter of chief importance is apparent if one considers 
the effect of the proposed amendment in a case involving due present- 
ment but faulty notice. The drawer would be discharged to the extent 
of the loss caused by the delay, which in the case supposed could only 
be the delay in giving notice; if an entire failure to give any notice can 
be spoken of as a delay. What this would be is hard to say. There has 
been considerable difficulty in determining what losses are caused by a 
failure to present in due time. See Ferrari v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 N. Y. 
383, 159 N. E. 178 (1927). The lower court decision, which was reversed 
on appeal, was criticized in (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 273. 
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be considered in arriving at a decision. On the further assump- 
tion that the effort, in the last analysis, is to write in detail the 
contracts of the parties to negotiable paper, the principal con- 
siderations in the case of any suggested amendment would seem 
to be the understanding and convenience of the parties them- 
selves, the possibilities of unfair practice and the extent of 
litigation to be expected. And further, in the case of losses 
through fault of a third party, it would seem desirable to take 
into consideration the relative ability of the parties to avoid the 
loss in the first instance, or to shift it to advantage. 
That everything possible has been done to obtain data on 
these points is plainly not the case. To consider only the matter 
of discharges of party or instrument in the suretyship cases, 
it is very apparent that nothing worthy the name of fact inves- 
tigation has been undertaken. When the act was originally 
prepared, the draftsman introduced an innovation in section 
120 (6) whereby the holder might extend the time of payment 
and yet preserve his recourse against secondary parties. It is 
proposed to sweep this aside, without any investigation as to its 
workability, in an effort to conform to common law decisions. 
In other cases, as for example the reasonable time after issue 
test for presentment obtaining in Nebraska as to demand paper, 
it does not appear that any examination has been made of the 
practical working of the rule, thus ignoring the possibility that 
an improvement on the common law rule has been achieved. And, 
in the case of many newer questions, such as that involving the 
practicability of the Wisconsin legislation validating accelera- 
tion provisions, no investigation appears to have been made, nor 
in fact is any amendment suggested. 
As one may perhaps have gathered from the foregoing it is 
the writer's opinion that common law decisions are of diminish- 
ing importance in the case of the negotiable instruments law. 
That statute has been in effect for over a quarter of a century. 
The present generation in commercial life has adjusted itself 
for the most part to the statute as drawn. It would seem almost 
imperative that the inquiry now must be whether the statute is 
meeting present conditions-not whether it squares with common 
law decisions. This is true not only in determining what view 
is to be adopted in the case of the present suggested amendments, 
but of perhaps more importance in determining what points are 
in need of legislative action. 
This is simply to recognize that the work of the Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws has in the case of the Negotiable In- 
struments Law, at least, reached a new and distinct stage. The 
committee is no longer chiefly engaged in codifying decisions. 
That was in great part done thirty years ago, and in the opinion 
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of the writer, the statute, with all its defects, real and imaginary, 
has proven itself decidedly worth while. But if this work is to 
avoid crystallization, a distinct possibility, and is to attain full 
utility, some group must assume continuous responsibility for 
keeping it apace with changing times and conditions. It is 
believed there is no other group better qualified to assume such 
a responsibility than the organization which originally drafted 
the statute. 
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